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Abstract. This paper describes DeepKey, an end-to-end deep neural ar-
chitecture capable of taking a digital RGB image of an ‘everyday’ scene
containing a pin tumbler key (e.g. lying on a table or carpet) and fully
automatically inferring a printable 3D key model. We report on the key
detection performance and describe how candidates can be transformed
into physical prints. We show an example opening a real-world lock. Our
system is described in detail, providing a breakdown of all components
including key detection, pose normalisation, bitting segmentation and 3D
model inference. We provide an in-depth evaluation and conclude by re-
flecting on limitations, applications, potential security risks and societal
impact. We contribute the DeepKey Datasets of 5, 300+ images covering
a few test keys with bounding boxes, pose and unaligned mask data.
1 Introduction and Overview
Imaging the detailed structural properties of physical keys is easily possible
using modern high-resolution cameras or smartphones. Such photography may
be undertaken by the rightful owner of a key to produce a visual backup or
by an untrusted third party. The latter could potentially image keys unnoticed,
particularly when considering scenarios that expose key rings in plain sight in
public (e.g. on a table at a cafe) or even private environments (e.g. on a kitchen
counter visible through a window).
In this paper we show that fully automated physical key generation from
photographic snapshots is a technical reality. Despite a low physical duplication
accuracy experienced with the described system, this raises wider questions and
highlights the need for adequate countermeasures. In particular, we will explain
here how a visual end-to-end convolutional neural network (CNN) architecture
can be used to generate 3D-printable pin tumbler key models from single RGB
images without user input. To the best of our knowledge the proposed system
is the first one that automates the task – that is compared to published semi-
manual approaches of potentially much higher replication quality [12].
As depicted in Figure 1, the deep neural network (DNN) pipeline put forward
here takes an ‘everyday’ scene containing a Yale pin tumbler key as input. It
then breaks vision-based key reconstruction down into a sequence of distinct
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Fig. 1. DeepKey Architecture. Overview of pipeline to generate a physical pin tum-
bler key from an RGB photograph. (a) Key Detection: Images are fed to a Resnet-
101-v2 [9] backbone followed by a feature pyramid network (FPN) [13], together re-
ferred to as an RFPN component. This RFPN, a region proposal network (RPN), and a
detection network combinedly perform proposal filtering, bounding box regression and
content classification [17]. (b) Pose Normalisation: Translation, scale, rotation and
warp normalisation of detected key patches is then implemented via a spatial trans-
former network (STN) [10], whilst a specialised RFPN controls flipping. (c) Bitting
Extraction: Segmentation of normalised patches is based on Mask R-CNN [7] inferring
binary bitting masks via an extended RFPN. (d) Key Inference: Masks are finally
converted to 3D-printable models to yield plastic prints of Yale keys. (e) Physical
Tests: Given models of sufficient quality, these key prints may open real-world locks,
although many distinct models may be required.
Faster R-CNN [17] component, whose outputs are transformed into a unified pose
domain by a customised spatial transformer network (STN) [10]. These pose-
normalised patches containing aligned instances are used to infer the bitting
pattern, exploiting the concepts of Mask R-CNN [7].
Finally, alignment and projection of the bitting mask onto a known ‘keyway’
yields a CAD entity, which may be 3D-printed into a physical object. Using
portions of the DeepKey Datasets as training information, our network pipeline
is first optimised at the component level before final steps proceed in a forward-
feeding end-to-end manner allowing for optimisation by the discovery of weight
correlations.
Before describing our architecture, training and recorded performance in de-
tail, we briefly review methodologies and prior work relevant to the application.
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Fig. 2. Pin Tumbler Keys and Locks. (a) Pin Tumbler Keys: For a given man-
ufacturer type the non-public key information is encoded in the bitting, which is the
target of the visual reconstruction. A key’s keyway is a secondary level of security, but
is publicly available, given the key type is known. Allowed cuts adhere to a maximum
adjacent cut specification (MACS) to ensure insertion and extraction of the key is al-
ways possible. (b-d) Pin Tumbler Locks: Unlocking requires raising a set of stacked
pins to particular, key-specific heights such that the entire cylinder can rotate cleanly.
2 Related Work and Context
2.1 Vision-based Key Replication
For this proof of concept we focus on the vision-based replication of Yale pin
tumbler keys only, a widely used key class and lock arrangement. As shown
in Figure 2, pin tumbler locks require the key to raise a set of stacked pins at
different heights such that the entire plug may rotate cleanly. This is achieved by
cuts made into one edge of the key, known as the ‘bitting’. For a given pin tumbler
lock type, such as Yale, it is the bitting alone that encodes the information unique
to an individual key. A key type’s remaining geometric information including its
‘keyway’ frontal profile is publicly available via manufacturer type patents that
legally prevent the reproduction of uncut keys without a license. Even without
accurate schematics, a key’s frontal profile can be determined from a single photo
of the key’s lock visible from the outside of the door [2].
Existing Vision-based Key Replication. Computational teleduplication
of physical keys via optical decoding was first published by Laxton et al. [12] who
designed a semi-automated system named ‘Sneakey’. Their software requires the
user to crop the key from an image and annotate manually two separate point
sets: a key-type-dependent one enabling planar homographic normalisation to a
rectified pose, and a lock-dependent one for decoding the individual bitting code.
2.2 Deep Learning Concepts
In this paper, we assume the key type to be fixed and the keyway to be known.
Automating vision-based key replication based on this, then evolves around
solving three ‘classic’ vision tasks: that is object(-class) detection and locali-
sation [11] of keys, rigid key pose estimation and normalisation [10], as well as
image segmentation [7] to extract the bitting pattern. A projection of the bitting
onto the known keyway will then generate a scale-accurate description as a CAD
model. Each of these three tasks has its own long-standing history, whose review
is beyond the scope of this paper. Thus, we focus on the most relevant works only.
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Object Detectors. For the pipeline at hand, mapping from input images to
localisations of instances is fundamental to spatially focus computational at-
tention. Across benchmark datasets [4,11,14] neural architectures now consis-
tently outperform traditional vision techniques in both object detection as well
as image classification [3,11,16,22]. Region-based convolutional neural networks
(R-CNNs) [6] combine these tasks by unifying candidate localisation and classifi-
cation – however, in its original form, R-CNNs are computationally expensive [5].
By sharing operations across proposals as in Fast R-CNN or SPPnet [5,8] effi-
ciency can be gained, although proposal estimation persists to be a bottleneck.
To address this, Ren et al. introduced region proposal networks (RPNs) [17],
which again share features during detection, resulting in the Faster R-CNN [17].
We use this approach here for initial candidate key detection, noting that various
alternative architectures such as YOLO [16] and Overfeat [21] are also viable.
Network Substructure. The base component in Faster R-CNNs, also referred
to as its ‘backbone’, can be altered or exchanged without breaking the approach’s
conceptual layout. Practically, deeper backbone networks often lead to improved
detection performance [22]. In response to this observation and as suggested by
He et al. [7], we utilise the well-tested 101-layer Resnet-101-v2 [9] backbone in
our work with final weight sharing (see Section 3.6). As shown in Figure 5, its
output feeds into a feature pyramid network (FPN) [13] similar in spatial lay-
out to traditional scale-space feature maps [1]. When considering the detection
application at hand where key height and width can vary vastly, the explicit use
of an FPN helps to detect keys at these various scales fast. Moreover, together
with the backbone, it forms a versatile RFPN network pair.
Normalisation and Segmentation. Fundamentally, RFPN components learn
scale-space features and, thus, have been shown to support a versatile array of
mapping tasks [17,7] – including segmentation. Mask R-CNNs [7] exemplify this
practically by adding further convolutional and then de-convolutional layers to
an RFPN in order to map to a binary mask (see Figure 7). We base our segmen-
tation architecture off this concept, but apply modifications to increase the final
mask resolution (see Section 3.4). Additionally, spatial transforms arising from
variance in viewpoint are rectified. Spatial transformer networks (STNs) [10]
are designed to deal with this task, although traditionally in an implicit way,
where the parameters of the transformation matrix that affects the image are
not known. Our STN estimates transformation matrix parameters directly after
object detection, unifying the representation and production of orthonormal key
views for segmentation (see Figure 6).
3 DeepKey Implementation
3.1 Generation of Training Information
We collected 5, 349 images of a few keys provided in two separate DeepKey
Datasets1 A and B, detailed in Figure 3, plus a tiny extra Test C (see Sec-
tion 5) featuring a key not contained in either set. Set A contains distant shots
1 DeepKey Datasets can be requested via https://data.bris.ac.uk
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Fig. 3. DeepKey Datasets. (left) Lower Resolution Dataset A: Examples from
2, 653 ‘everyday’ scenes resolved at 5184x3456 pixels containing both rectification pat-
terns for training and an ordinary pin tumbler key at resolutions ranging from 78×21 to
746× 439 primarily used to train key detection components; (right) Higher Resolu-
tion Dataset B: Examples from 2, 696 scenes of seven different pin tumbler keys and
rectification patterns resolved at 5184x3456 pixels with key resolutions from 171× 211
to 689× 487 pixels primarily used to train bitting segmentation networks. Lowest res-
olution key patches from both datasets are visualised in the upper-right-most images.
of common environments that may contain keys – such as tables, carpets, road
surfaces, and wooden boards. Set B contains shots with keys at higher resolution,
but less environmental context. We divide the datasets into a traditional split
of approx. 70% for system training and a withheld portion of remaining images
for validation. To allow for automatic data annotation, we developed a physi-
cal marker frame which is placed around keys in the real world (see Figures 3
and 4), with placement aided by a custom-developed mobile app using an iPhone
7 smartphone. The marker board essentially provides four points, which can be
used during a postprocessing step to calculate a projective transform per image.
This automatic meta-annotation allows us to reduce labelling and produce larger
training sets with exact parameterisation for backpropagation during learning.
3.2 Pose-invariant Key Detection
Our detailed detection architecture is depicted in Figure 5. Woven around a
Faster R-CNN layout with a training RPN proposal limit of 200 we utilise a
Resnet-101-v2 as the network backbone. An empirical study of similar alter-
natives as shown in Figure 5 (right) confirms its efficacy. Inspired by Mask
R-CNN [7], the FPN fed by this backbone provides improved scale-dependent
detection performance. It takes Resnet blocks C2, C3, C4, C5 and adds lateral
connections as shown in Figure 5. We feed in resized images at 224× 224 pixels
and used a pooling size of 8×8 when resizing cropped feature-map regions. With
training images augmented from DeepKey Datasets A and B, we first froze our
backbone to fine-tune remaining layers via SGD with momentum (λ = 0.9) with
batch size 16 and learning rate (LR) of 0.001 for 400 epochs – before unfreezing
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Fig. 4. Perspective Ground Truth and Augmentation. (left) Marker Frame:
Annotation of training images via 4 ArUco markers, pasted on a rigid card base. Au-
tomatic labelling locates each marker and generates a bounding box and transforma-
tion matrix per image. (right) Synthetic Data Augmentation: The application of
pseudo-random crop, scale, flip and shift augmentations to the data yields further syn-
thetic data. Shown are an original example image (top left) and three derived augmen-
tations next to it. In addition, the two right-most images illustrate the marker frame
exclusion augmentation used as an alternative evaluation strategy (see Section 4).
the backbone and lowering the LR by factor 10 and optimizing for 400 epochs
further. We use log losses for RPN and detection head classification as detailed
in [18], and a smooth L1 loss as defined in [5] for bounding box regression. We
evaluate the detection component in detail in Section 4 where Figure 9 visualises
results. Note that we carry out a comparative study confirming that the poten-
tial presence of marker frame pixels in the receptive fields of network layers has
no application-preventing impact on key detection performance.
3.3 Pose Normalisation
In order to map key detections into unified pose we opt to use traditional geomet-
ric transform operations fuelled by deep network predictions of eight perspective
transform parameters as well as flips. Figure 6 (left) shows the used architec-
ture in detail. Following [25], an STN first predicts eight parameters forming a
transformation matrix, which are applied to the input via a projective trans-
form. Rather than applying STNs in a traditional unsupervised manner, we
train against our labelled dataset of transform parameters, using an averaged
L2 norm loss (MSE) detailed in [19]. Note that we do not use the features from
our Resnet-101 backbone, but instead opt to take a shallower number of convo-
lutions from the raw image. A subsequent flip classification network determines
whether the key requires flipping such that its bitting faces up, readily aligned
for bitting segmentation. Using SGD with momentum (λ = 0.9) and batch size
32, pose normalisation and flip classification are repeatedly trained on DeepKey
Dataset B key patches, with random augmentations resolved at 128×128 pixels,
against pre-computed marker frame ground truths as detailed in Figure 4.
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Fig. 5. Detection Network Architecture. (left) Component Details: In-depth
description of the layout of our detection component, where Resnet-101-v2 is used as the
backbone. (right) Backbone Performance Study: Results depict the performance
impact of using different networks as backbone. Note the performance/size trade-of
struck by Resnet-101-v2 compared to the various alternatives investigated.
Inspired by [10], pose normalisation uses a LR of 0.01 and flip classification a
LR of 0.00001 for the first 400 epochs. Afterwards, LRs are reduced by 10×
before continuing for further 400 epochs. Flip classification uses a softmax cross
entropy loss as in [19]. As in the detection network, all non-final convolutional
and fully connected layers use ReLU as non-linearity. Only fully-connected lay-
ers are regularised via dropout at an empirically optimised rate of 0.3. During
pose normalisation training parameters of the loss are normalised. Note that the
standard deviation of each parameter is found and based on that the eight free
parameters θ0, θ1, θ2...θ7 are normalised to speed up convergence.
Fig. 6. Pose Normalisation Architecture. (left) Component Details: In order
to normalise pose, an STN predicts 8 mapping parameters on whose basis a perspective
transform is applied (white). Subsequently, a classification network determines whether
or not an image flip should be performed. (right) Examples of Normalised Keys:
Representative sample patches before and after pose normalisation and flip correction.
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Fig. 7. Segmentation Architecture, Mask Examples and Key Modelling.
(left) Component Overview: Normalised key crops are fed through our modified
Mask-RCNN head, where the additional deconvolutions and larger pool size provides
us greater output resolution. (middle) Segmentation Examples after End-to-End
Optimisation: Final pose normalisations and bitting segmentations after running test
samples through the full end-to-end system. Masks are resized from 56×56 pixel output.
Top 2 examples show valid bitting segmentation whereas others highlight cases where
normalisation errors cause incorrect bitting segmentation. These incorrect segmenta-
tion look like plausable key masks but do not match the ground truth. (right) Mod-
elling Process: Separate components of the key that are either provided by the user
or determined by the pipeline are fused together to create a printable STL file.
3.4 Bitting Segmentation
Figure 7 depicts how normalised patches are utilised to produce bitting masks
inspired by Mask R-CNN [7]. However, in contrast to [7] and given scale pre-
normalisation, we only compute FPN layer P2 encoded at the highest resolution
and use 8 convolutions (rather than 4) before de-convolution. We found this
provides higher precision in mask outputs when paired with a pool size of 28,
resulting in a final mask size of 56 × 56 pixels as seen in Figure 7. In order
to accurately align the output mask with the keyway, we define ground truth
masks with small activation areas of two key points as further pixel classes to
train on – following [7]. We use DeepKey Dataset B at a LR of 0.001 and SGD
with momentum (λ = 0.9) for training. LR was reduced by a factor 10 after 400
epochs before running further 400 epochs. As given in [7], our masking loss was
average binary cross entropy loss with a per-pixel sigmoid on final layer logits.
3.5 3D Model Generation and Printing
The estimated key mask, key points, keyway profile and real-world keyway height
are used for 3D key model generation. Binarisations of the bitting mask are
transformed into a series of key boundary points. Using this description, this
bitting and the known keyway can be extruded along orthogonal axes and key
point locations are aligned (scaled+translated) with the keyway via scripts [15],
where the final key blade is constructed by union and attachment of a standard
key bow before outputting an STL file printable using [23].
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3.6 Final Optimisation via an End-to-End Pipeline
After training all subcomponents as described, we then progress to the end-to-
end training of components by forwarding data generated by each subcomponent
as training data to subsequent components in order to optimise the overall sys-
tem. This two-step process of bootstrapping each subcomponent’s weights from
separately provided ground truth mitigated the effect of early stage errors.
During end-to-end training, we only generate training data from the DeepKey
Dataset B adjusting the detection component to take input sizes of 1024× 1024
(up from the 224 × 224 standard of [11]) due to resolution requirements of the
later stages. Additionally, we use input batches of 2 and a detection proposal
limit of 32 so that later stages experience an effective batch size of 64 because
of GPU size limitations – all other training parameters are inherited from the
definitions provided in each subcomponent’s section. Inputs are processed end-
to-end for 200 epochs to train with frozen backbones, followed by a further 800
epochs at 1/10 LR, and a final 800 epochs with unfrozen backbones and a batch
size of only 2 at a LR of 10−7.
In order to fit the end-to-end pipeline onto Blue Crystal 4 [24] Nvidia P100
GPU nodes used for all optimisations of this paper, we opted to share the learned
weights between the three backbone instances across the architecture. Despite
weight sharing, performance improvements can still be recorded under our for-
warding end-to-end paradigm.
4 Results
This section discusses and evaluates in detail metrics that quantify the perfor-
mance of each subcomponent and the overall DeepKey system. For detection
evaluation, six different types of test data arrangements will be used, all derived
from withheld testset portions of the DeepKey Datasets: 1) first, 875 withheld
original low-resolution images from Dataset A; 2) 875 images derived from the
former via augmentation (reminder of Figure 4); 3) 889 withheld original high-
resolution images from Dataset B; 4) 889 images derived from the former via
augmentation; 5) 889 withheld original high resolution images from Dataset B
with marker frame removal; and 6) 889 images derived from the former via aug-
mentation. All subsequent component evaluations utilise Dataset variation 3.
Marker frame removal is applied to guarantee full independence from marker-
board presence during tests. Whilst augmentations (see Section 3) allow for val-
idation using a larger number of geometric transforms than found in the data
gathered, in order to ensure we are not applying augmentations to manipulate
object detection results in our favour, we also compare to non-augmented data.
Figure 8 (left) shows an overview of key detection performance results for all
six test data arrangements. Figure 9 then exemplifies detection and quantifies
localisation regression. It provides a precision-recall analysis of improvements
provided by localisation regression.
It can be seen that key-class object detection produces the highest AP of 0.997
upon the original DeepKey Testset B. The system achieves a lower AP when
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Test Dataset Augmented AP
(1) A 0.955
(2) A X 0.771
(3) B 0.997
(4) B X 0.978
(5) B noframe 0.977
(6) B noframe X 0.911
-
Fig. 8. Detection and Normalisation Visualisations and Metrics. (left) De-
tection AP Metrics: Results are shown for all six test cases covering original test
data, geometric augmentations, as well as ’noframe’ tests with augmentation of colours
of all marker pixels and those outside the marker black. (right) Pose Normalisa-
tion Metrics: Pose normalisation results in low parameter value MSE achieved on
the DeepKey TestSet B, where flip classification achieves an AUC of 0.973.
full augmentation is applied. Our results show only a negligible decrease in AP
when removing marker information. Thus, the bias towards images containing
markers as introduced in training is small – key detection AP on the original
DeepKey Testset B reduces by 2.00% from AP = 0.997 to AP = 0.977 upon
marker frame removal from test instances. Figure 8 (right) shows an overview
of pose normalisation performance results, where the process can be seen de-
....
Fig. 9. Detection Head Performance. (left) Correct Proposal Samples: Four
input images and their detection head bounding box regressions. Dotted boxes indicate
original proposals from the RPN and are depicted with their regressed solid box coun-
terparts by similarly coloured lines. In the featured samples, the firstly somewhat mis-
aligned RPN proposals are regressed to common bounding boxes that correctly bound
their target keys. (right) Precision-Recall Metric: Precision-recall curve for the first
(AP = 0.901) and then the regressed final detection head proposals (AP = 0.978 as
reported in Figure 8) when run on augmented images derived from DeepKey Testset B.
DeepKey: Towards Physical Key Replication From a Single Photograph. 11
Fig. 10. Flip Classification Visualisation. (a,e) Original Input Patches:
RGB normalised key crops of the flipped and unflipped classes. (b,f) Grad-CAM
Heatmaps: Overlayed on top of original images showing areas of interest to the fi-
nal convolutional layer before fully connected layers and predictions. Note how on the
flipped key the shoulder of the key is seen as interesting to the final layer whereas on the
unflipped key, the key bitting is used. (c,g) Guided Back-Propagation: Visualisation
of features important to the prediction. (d,h) Guided Grad-CAM: Combining Grad-
CAM with guided back-prop to highlight potentially class-discriminative features.
picted in Figure 6 (right) key samples are successfully normalised and flipped.
We record the MSE across all values of the transformation matrices generated
by pose normalisation inference to produce a histogram showing the error distri-
bution. In addition, we produce a receiver operating characteristic (ROC) plot
for flip classification. Our flip classification network operates with an AUC of
0.973. Via the application of Gradcam [20], it can be seen that, as depicted in
Figure 10, the network activations of this component focus indeed on key bit-
ting and shoulder during flip classification, as required to determine orientation.
Transformation estimation performs as described in Figure 8 (right), however, a
small absolute error can of course still result in a clearly visible transformation
error, as depicted by non-horizontal keys in Figures 6 (right).
When evaluating the bitting segmentation, we take an approach contrary
to the standard in image segmentation: rather than only calculating the pixel
mask IoU as in [7], we also focus our evaluation on the bitting of the keys by
casting rays at manually annotated locations required for pin lifting in a lock.
These virtual pins emulate the success criteria in the real-world where lock pins
must be raised or lowered to a satisfactory height. Figure 11 comprehensively
visualises the metrics we use to evaluate the bitting segmentation, utilising three
different metrics: (top row) the ‘max pin height’ (MPE) error reflects the largest
difference across all cuts on a key, and is the most practical metric as reality
requires that not one pin produce error beyond some threshold; (second row)
‘mean pin height’ error takes the mean across all pins per key, producing a
conceptual metric of how far the bitting of a key is from ground truth; (third
row) ‘pixel IoU’ is included for the sake of comparison.
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Fig. 11. Bitting Segmentation Error Visualisation. Ground truth masks in left
column, segmentation examples of this key on the right. Per-mask errors are given
on each mask. (top to bottom) MPE: Error is calculated as max difference between
ground truth cut height and measured segmentation cut height at virtual pin locations.
This metric favours keys with shallow bittings as segmentations tend to smooth. Mean:
Error is calculated as mean difference between ground truth cut height and measured
cut height at virtual pin locations. We find this metric scores best on validation keys
of a similar type to those in the training set, which exhibit little variation. IoU: Error
is the pixelwise intersection between mask and ground truth, divided by the area of
the mask. Segmentations with low edge noise produce the lowest error scores with this
metric. Unseen MPE: Same as MPE, but with an unseen key, not in dataset A or B.
The practically most relevant metric is that of MPE: Figure 11 (bottom)
includes a mask never seen in training data (outside DeepKey Datasets A and B)
with an MPE of 0.0122 – we use example output to print a physical sample and
successfully open its target lock as shown in Figure 12. For this test, we estimate
physical operation capable of unlocking the target when used with a key showing
a segmentation error of MPE <= 0.012, however, we note that higher quality
locks will feature lower bitting error tolerances. Across our validation set, mean
MPE is 0.039, far higher than the quality example given in Figure 11 (top).
5 Physical Proof-of-Concept
Consequently, according to the result statistics, only a small proportion of physi-
cal replicas generated are expected to work in opening the target lock. To provide
a proof of concept that real-world locks can indeed be opened using the system,
we evaluate the full pipeline empirically using a tiny, new set of test images
(withheld DeepKey Dataset C) of a hitherto, unseen key exemplified in the top
left image of Figure 12. We manually select the top 5 end-to-end masks – three
of these masks can be seen in Figure 11 (bottom). From this test set of 5, we find
that only 1 is capable of unlocking the target lock as shown in Figure 12. Al-
though the heights of the pins differ from the ground truth key, the lock still
operates correctly due to in-built tolerances as explained in the results section.
We would expect truly high-quality locks to reject such a key. For this proof-of-
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Fig. 12. Physical Key Prediction Example. (top-left) Example of Unseen Im-
age: Sample image from the unseen DeepKey Dataset C, without the inclusion of any
marker frames. The selected key detection undergoes normalisation and is rectified,
which in turn allows segmentation to successfully take place. (top-right) Sampled
Segmentations: 5 manually selected samples from the end-to-end segmentation out-
put used to print physical keys for tests. (bottom) 3D Printed Key Opens Lock:
Red ground truth key raises all lock pins to their valid positions. Print (a) resulting
from the above end-to-end system output also raises all lock pins to sufficient lev-
els, although they are visibly slightly different from those of the ground truth key. A
secondary print (b) exhibits too large deviance in bitting to open the lock.
concept study many prints were needed to yield one that opens the target lock.
Nevertheless, the study shows that given an image of appropriate quality, the
system is after possibly many trials eventually capable of producing a valid,
lock-opening key from a single visual image. Further analyses of the detailed
conditions that lead to images and prints of sufficient quality to successful open
locks with the system would be an important step, however, this is outside the
scope of this paper and would require significant further work.
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6 Reflection, Potential Societal Impact, and Conclusion
The usability of basic key imagery for the production of key models that are
potentially capable of unlocking a physical target lock, be that via a traditional
vision system [12] or via a deep learning approach such as DeepKey, raises various
questions about any potential impact on physical security and society overall.
Whilst applications for legitimate owners to visually backup their keys could
mitigate accidental loss, one also has to consider the case of assailants taking a
series of still RGB pictures of a key through a window and printing replicas using
a potentially mobile 3D printer. Our results show that DeepKey, as described, is
of limited use in such a scenario since multiple key models and prints are likely
to be required, as not every model will be valid, and the number of attempts
needed will rise as the lock quality increases due to lower error tolerances. Thus,
it is probable that many prints, possibly 10s or even 100s may be needed to
produce a working key using DeepKey depending on the scenario.
Whilst we believe that increased final prediction resolution trained via larger
GPUs may be beneficial re improving accuracy, the potential for systems like
DeepKey to cause a general threat to public lock-users is also hamstrung by the
large variety of lock types available today. We assessed only the application of
automated key model prediction to one type of Yale pin tumbler keys.
Most importantly, however, everyone should consider that basic countermea-
sures such as avoidance of visual exposure or bitting-covering key rings are simple
and effective ways to deny unwanted key imaging. New architectures and ap-
proaches to lock-based security such as those featuring multi-sided 3D bittings
may also be effective in minimising the risk of unwanted photographic capture.
Magnetic locks in particular provide security properties outside the visual do-
main since the key’s secret is encoded in the orientation of embedded magnets.
Due to the lack in visual variance of such keys, any visual system would be
entirely ineffective in capturing the key’s secret information.
We hope that the publication of DeepKey can inspire research into coun-
termeasures and legitimate security applications, whilst also acting as an early
warning: academia, lock producers, authorities and the general public must be
alerted to the growing potential of deep learning driven visual attacks in an
unprepared physical security world.
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